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1
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- Julie A. Caswell
- and
- David Sparling
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2
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- Integration of NAFTA beef industries
- BSE as a case study
- Impact of BSE on the NAFTA beef markets
- Integrated markets – integrated regulations?
- Implications and challenges for policy
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3
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- Prior to CUSTA and NAFTA tariffs inhibited extensive integration
- 1989– CUSTA removed Canada/US barriers
- 1994 – NAFTA removed barriers to trade with Mexico
- Extensive integration at every level
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4
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5
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- Source: Canfax and Gracey 2002, The Cattle Cycle, p. 19.
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6
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7
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8
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9
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- Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
- Disease of the central nervous system in cattle
- Origin uncertain but believed to be linked to ingesting feed containing
rendered central nervous system material from contaminated animals
- Thought to be linked to CJD – fatal in humans
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10
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- Beef industry is integrated at every level
- Integration interdependence
- Smooth operation of NAFTA industry depends on flow of cattle and beef
- Impact of a case of BSE is immediate and substantial
- Management of BSE is an interesting mix of science and politics
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11
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- Private Events
- Risks and impacts limited to supply chains in which they occur
- E. coli, Salmonella
- Government response
- Censure – fines, closures
- Additional monitoring
- Industry wide initiatives to reduce risk
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12
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- Public Events
- Impacts reach outside supply chain
- Impact may be
- Regional – Avian Influenza in British Columbia
- National – BSE, Foot & Mouth Disease
- Trade distorting
- Government Response
- Assessment of the impact and notification of trading partners and OIE
- New regulations
- Mitigation of impacts
- Industry survival and recovery strategies
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13
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- BSE protocols managed by the OIE
- Based on risk analysis - science based
- 5 levels of BSE risk status
- Guidance on import restrictions for cattle and beef for each risk
status
- Country goal - BSE free status
- Importing countries’ response to BSE case in previously BSE free
country, contrary to OIE guidance, is complete closure of borders for
cattle and beef
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14
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15
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- May 20, 2003 – Canada
- One animal found with BSE
- Animal had already been removed from the food system
- Trading partners notified
- All borders closed immediately for cattle and beef
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16
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17
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- Canadian market oversupplied
- Farm gate prices plummeted 50%
- Imports dropped 50%
- Already tight U.S. market undersupplied
- By fall the Mexican market became tight and prices began to rise
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18
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- September 2003
- U.S. reviewed Canadian response to BSE event and risk of importing BSE
from Canada
- Gave Canada a special low risk status
- Imports of de-boned beef from cattle under 30 months allowed
- Mexico took similar action
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19
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20
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- Dec. 23, 2003
- BSE found in U.S. dairy cow
- Traced back to Canadian herd
- Possibility that it was fed ruminant protein prior to total feed ban
- Traceback could only locate half of animals which may have received the
same feed
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21
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- All exports halted
- Redirected to already tight U.S. market
- Prices eased back from record highs
- Mexican market now short and prices increased by as much as 15% in early
2004
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22
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23
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- In March-April 2004, Mexico and Canada reopened border to U.S. boneless
beef cuts from animals under 30 months
- No reopening yet for live animals
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24
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- Dramatic example
- Market integration exacerbating trade disruptions when problems occur
- Importance of risk management systems
- Drawbacks of market integration without regulatory integration
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25
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- Country
- Risk analysis
- Choosing appropriate level of protection
- Designing the regulatory program
- Country to Country
- Policy coordination
- Equivalence agreements
- Harmonization
- Internationally
- SPS Agreement of WTO
- International Standards Bodies
- World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)
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26
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- Inadequate risk management at country level
- Inadequate regulatory integration within NAFTA
- Breakdown of international discipline on import restrictions
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27
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- Criteria for determining BSE status
- 5 status levels
- BSE free
- BSE provisionally free
- Minimal BSE risk
- Moderate BSE risk
- High BSE risk
- OIE does not evaluate countries and assign them to a status
- Importing countries judge the status of
exporting countries
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28
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- OIE recommends:
- Import restrictions that are appropriate for each risk status
- KEY POINT: in no case recommends complete prohibition of imports when
BSE free status is lost
- What countries do:
- Immediately close borders to imports from country with BSE case(s)
- RESULT: huge trade impacts
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29
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- Set up by failure of international discipline on BSE management
- NAFTA countries were full partners
- Aided by lack of regulatory integration within NAFTA to control internal
impacts
- Further abetted by inadequate risk management at the country level
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30
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- Putting new regulations in place
- Reopening borders
- Encourage all to follow OIE standards, prove minimal BSE risk
- Negotiate ad hoc border openings (perhaps based on OIE standards)
- Accomplished within NAFTA for many beef products from younger animals
- Not accomplished yet for live animals
- Little progress with other trading partners
- Being prepared for more cases
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31
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- NAFTA is pursuing high level of market integration
- E.g., with elimination of tariffs
- But has a relatively low level of coordination in regard to nontariff
barriers, such as regulations
- Economic integration has outrun regulatory integration, leaving
industries more vulnerable to disruption
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32
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- Same or very similar:
- Scientific assessment of risk
- Choice of appropriate level of protection for human health
- Different benefit-cost calculus due to:
- Uncertainties
- Costs and acceptable level of costs
- Market risks of problems (e.g., first or subsequent BSE cases)
- Regulatory culture
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33
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- There are legitimate reasons why countries are reluctant to harmonize
regulatory policy
- And market integration within NAFTA poses problems for exports to
non-NAFTA countries
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34
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- Through ad hoc negotiation of border openings
- Go further?
- Integrated Risk Management System
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35
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36
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- NAFTA currently has no mechanism to move toward regulatory integration
except on a very ad hoc basis
- Serviceable mechanisms exist for closer coordination of regulatory
policy but they are limited
- NAFTA countries will have to decide to what extent to take the next step
toward policy harmonization
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37
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- Partly due to international breakdown in regard to BSE but
- KEY POINT: Bulk of trade impact was within NAFTA and could have been
avoided through concerted effort before the fact (before BSE cases)
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38
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- Harmonization itself depends on further development of risk management
capabilities in each country
- Failure to address regulatory integration will be:
- A continuing drag on market integration
- Leave markets vulnerable to recurring disruptions
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39
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- Integrated markets put a premium on good risk management
- Integrated markets put a premium on integrated risk management
- NAFTA trade disruptions as a result of BSE were unnecessarily large due
to shortcomings in both these areas
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